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Appellee's Brief greatly misconstrues the discretion of Utah District Courts to grant 
defaults in cases of inability to comply with scheduling orders, gravely misstates the facts 
shown by the record in this case, and would simply ignore an obvious denial of 
constitutional due process. In the course of doing so, the brief neglects to contest that the 
claim of prejudice to appellee on which the default in this case was based, was simply false, 
or that any such prejudice was readily avoidable by appellee. In sum, appellee's Brief fails 
to provide a defense for a default judgment which, on its face, was precipitate and 
unsupported by the record. 
THE DISTRICT COURT MUST FIND. ON AN ADEQUATE RECORD. THAT ANY 
NON-COMPLIANCE WAS VOLUNTARY 
Appellee disputes appellant's assertion of law that default is not an appropriate 
sanction for non-compliance with a scheduling order unless the court finds that the non-
compliance was willful or intentional. Appellee cites Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 
938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997), which asserts that the court "must find . . . willfulness, bad 
faith or fault . . . or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process". Thus 
appellee says, for example, that the court need not find the non-compliance intentional or 
in "bad faith"; it may simply find it "willful". To demonstrate the distinction, appellee asserts 
that " . . . to be considered 'willful', Defendant's conduct need only be 'any intentional 
failure as distinguished from involuntary non-compliance'...." citing Tuck v. Godfrey, 981 
P.2d 407 (U. App. 1999). 
This circularity demonstrates no significant distinction. Behavior which is not 
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voluntary - "intentional", "willful", in "bad faith or fault", "persistent dilatory tactics" - is not 
subject to sanctions. There are no cases which suggest that the sanction of default is 
sustainable where defendant is prevented against his will from fully complying.1 
Apparently, appellee takes the fact that District Courts have "primary" responsibility 
with regard to sanctions, and that their decisions in this regard are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, to mean that the District Courts have "wide latitude" in these matters. In fact, 
the Utah cases are uniform that any such discretion is narrowly circumscribed, and will not 
be sustained in the absence of a record which supports the sanction chosen. Morton v. 
Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271,274 (Utah 1997); Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schlatter, 
768 P.2d 950, 961 (U. Apps. 1989); Hales v. Oldrovd, 999 P.2d 588, 592 (U. App. 2000); 
Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1964). The inescapable fact in the 
present case is that while the District Court entered Findings and Conclusions, it did not 
make a record from which it could be determined that its discretion may have been properly 
exercised. 
Appellee simply ignores this part of the rule: the court must make specific findings, 
1
 A footnote in Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 852 P.2d 4, 7 (n.2) (Utah 
1993), suggests that the Supreme Court once sustained a default (in W.W. & W.B. 
Gardiner, Inc., v. Park West Village, Inc.. 568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1997) "without a 
showing of willfulness, bad faith or fault" where the court found "persistent dilatory 
tactics frustrating the judicial process". In Gardiner, however, the Court did not 
distinguish between "willfulness" and "bad faith", and required "frustration of the judicial 
process" which "impedes trial on the merits and makes it impossible to ascertain whether 
the allegations . . . have any factual merit." 568 P.2d at 738. Respectfully, it confounds 
the ordinary meaning of the words to suggest that "persistent dilatory tactics" can be 
committed involuntarily, or that refusal to prove one's allegations can be other than in 
"bad faith". In any case, there is nothing like a finding of frustration of the judicial 
process by defendants in the present case. 
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upon sufficient evidence, that the non-compliance was willful The Court "must find . . . 
willfulness . . . etc.", Morton, supra, 938 P.2d at 204. A "court may impose sanctions under 
Rule 37 only after the court finds 'willfulness, bad faith, or fault, or persistent dilatory 
tactics frustrating the judicial process". Tuck v. Godfrey, supra, 981 P.2d at 411. "Before 
imposing sanctions, the court must find . . . willfulness, bad faith, or fault, or persistent 
dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process". Hales v. Oldroyd, 999 P.2d 588, 592 (U. 
App. 2000). Appellee does not pretend that the District Court, despite having made 
findings and conclusions, made any finding that any non-compliance in this case was 
voluntary. It did not. The entire basis for the ruling below is simply that some non-
compliance occurred, which appellee claimed was "prejudicial". 
Instead, appellee argues that a partisan reading of select facts, ignoring proffered 
evidence that any non-compliance was involuntary, could now produce a conclusion of 
"willfulness", etc. In support of ignoring the offer to prove that any non-compliance was 
involuntary, appellee asserts for the first time that "Defendants have produced an array of 
extra-record unauthenticated hearsay documents, most of which are in Dutch . . . ." 
The documents (Exhibits "A", "D", Brief of Appellants, R. 305-328) are not "extra 
record". They were part of a proffer to the District Court on appellant's Motion for 
Reconsideration. The District Court was advised that the documentation was produced in 
haste, and was only partially translated, but would be promptly translated to permit full 
reconsideration. The documents, as explained to the Court, contain a collection of official 
Dutch court documents, properly endorsed, setting out the course and dates of the 
prosecution which had prevented timely compliance. These documents are regular on their 
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face and could hardly be fakes. In any case, they included the translated statement of 
Dutch counsel, Mr. Starmanns, vouching for the accuracy of the general representations. 
The documents are generally ones which, unless objected to, may be treated as self-
authenticating. U.R. Ev. Rule 902 (3), (6). The Court will recall, moreover, that 
"representations of counsel" was the evidentiary standard upon which the District Court had 
based the default. 
In response to submission of these documents to the District Court, appellee raised 
none of the objections it raises now, and, thus, waived them. See Exhibit "E", Brief of 
Appellants, UP & L's Response to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, R. 332-337. 
Appellee's Response appears to treat the documents and the statements about them as true, 
but like the District Court's "Ruling" which followed it, treats the issue of whether any non-
compliance was voluntary as irrelevant. Appellee took the position, and the District Court 
adopted it, that all that mattered was that some non-compliance had occurred, and some 
"prejudice" was alleged. 
The documents and statements proffered without objection were sufficient to raise 
the issue of voluntariness of any non-compliance. The District Court could readily have 
reserved judgment pending a hearing and full translation and authentication of the 
documents. It simply declined to consider the issue of voluntariness. The documents were 
accompanied by a summary of the appraisal for which an extension had been granted 
previously, showing both that a genuine issue of valuation existed and that the appraisal 
could be completed very shortly. The submission was sufficient to show that a genuine 
constitutional issue existed whether any sanction was appropriate, that any delay resulting 
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from any non-compliance was likely to be de minimis, and that a default on its face denied 
constitutionally required due process. The District Court's response, at appellee's 
prompting, amounted to simple refusal to consider such matters. 
The rule applied in Utah is that an abuse of discretion in imposing sanctions will be 
found where the District Court fails to provide an evidentiary record supporting its action. 
The District Court must find, based upon sufficient evidence, that any non-compliance was 
at least voluntary. E.g., Morton, supra, 938 P.2d at 274, 276; Wright v. Wright 941 P.2d 
646, 649 (U. Apps. 1997). While the District Court here entered the Findings and 
Conclusions proffered by plaintiff, it made no effort to determine whether any non-
compliance was voluntary, or the sanction was app opriate, and its conclusion that prejudice 
had resulted to plaintiff was not based upon competent evidence, and was demonstrably 
false. 
While appellee attempts to inflate the evidence available to show wrongdoing on the 
part of defendants, what the record in fact shows is that initial delay was excused because 
the court recognized that it was involuntary, but that when the same difficulties were 
repeated, causing a second delay, the court declined to consider the reason. The record 
further shows that the "prejudice" which appellee alleged, and which was the only colorable 
basis given for the ruling, was always readily avoidable by appellee, and, in fact, never 
occurred. 
While appellee now asserts that the evidence considered by the District Court might 
have sustained a finding of "willfulness" by defendants had the District Court cared to make 
one, the fact is that the District Court did not make one, and could not properly have done 
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so without considering defendants' evidence. Had the District Court considered the 
evidence proffered by defendants, it could not properly have drawn any conclusion except 
that any non-compliance was involuntary. 
The District Court's record is wholly inadequate to sustain its ruling. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF "FRUSTRATION OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS" 
Appellee's reconstruction of the facts of this case ("From April 8, 1999, to April 11, 
2000, Defendants did nothing to advance this litigation, and specifically, did not produce an 
appraisal that would contradict the $196,070.00 appraisal previously submitted by 
PacifiCorp."), is almost farcical. There was no "$196,070.00 appraisal previously submitted 
by PacifiCorp." There was a poorly supported "affidavit" of Bryce Clinger, which did not 
constitute an appraisal. See Exhibit "A" hereto, R. 39-45. Following April 8, 1999, there 
was a Request for Continuance, which was granted, and a Motion for Leave to Withdraw, 
also granted. Counsel subsequently re-appeared. There was then entered a Pretrial 
Scheduling Order. Counsel then felt compelled to withdraw again, but shortly before the 
scheduled conference on April 11, 2000, notified the District Court and counsel that he 
would re-appear. The default was precipitated by counsel's tardiness, without fault, in 
appearing at the pretrial conference. 
There is no evidence of "repeated failure" to comply with scheduling orders. There 
is a single non-compliance. There is no evidence that, except during periods of 
incarceration and occupation in a Dutch criminal prosecution, defendants were in any 
degree dilatory in completing an appraisal. Indeed, the evidence shows that the complex 
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and lengthy appraisal had been virtually completed by April 11, 2000, and required only a 
short further extension. 
There was submitted with appellants' Motion for Reconsideration a summary of Mr. 
Chudleigh's nearly completed appraisal. While the document is merely a summary, it has 
at least the status of the "Affidavit of Biyce A. dinger" (Exhibit "A" hereto, R. 39-45) 
submitted by PacifiCorp in order to obtain an Order of Immediate Occupancy. Certainly, 
its conclusion that $1,182,000.00 was due contradicts Mr. dinger's earlier thumbnail 
estimate of $196,070.00 and states at least equally appropriate support for the conclusions. 
It is apparent on the face of the document that it could not have been produced overnight, 
but resulted from substantial amounts of work following the prior scheduling conference, 
during the periods in which appellant's representative was not subjected to prosecution in 
Holland. In any case, counsel for appellee was so informed shortly before the scheduling 
conference on April 11, 2000, and agreed that a further short extension of the schedule was 
in order. 
Nothing prevented such a further short extension of the schedule except the fact that 
defendant's counsel was unavoidably delayed on the morning of April 11, 2000. No one 
pretends that if counsel had not been delayed on April 11, 2000, a default would have been 
entered. The purpose of the conference April 11, 2000, was to schedule trial and related 
matters. There is literally nothing in the record to show that any trial date the District 
Court could have assigned would not have permitted time to complete the appraisal and any 
necessary discovery or motions related to it. 
Accordingly, there is no evidence of any kind of "frustration of the judicial process." 
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It is entirely possible that precisely the same judicial process would have occurred had 
counsel not been tardy on April 11, 2000, as could have occurred notwithstanding the 
tardiness. 
The only reason suggested below why the delay defendants had required to complete 
the matter was in any degree prejudicial was that, pending a determination of the right to 
take, the local authority, Wasatch County, declined to issue building permits. Plaintiff had 
an order of immediate occupancy. It could have commenced construction at any time, 
except that it could not obtain permits. It could not obtain permits because, as part of the 
extensive planning and approval of defendant's land for a resort/recreational development 
of importance to the County, plaintiff had contracted in writing to put its substation 
elsewhere. The County enforced its interest in this promise by declining permits while the 
issue of plaintiffs right to violate its agreement remained pending. 
Further, plaintiff does not contest that it could have brought the issue of its 
obligation to locate the substation elsewhere to a decision on motion at any time, avoiding 
any delay due to defendant's need for further time to prove value. Plaintiff did not so 
proceed either because it feared the result, or feared that, if it prevailed and built the 
substation, it would subsequently be shown to have caused greater damage than it wished 
to compensate. It is disingenuous to suggest that defendant deterred plaintiff by delaying 
revelation of defendant's appraisal: condemnors who obtain orders of immediate occupancy 
rely, as a matter of statute, on the integrity and accuracy of their own "appraisals". 
The default entered in this case simply avoids a fair resolution of the issues: plaintiff 
gets the land for a pittance, and avoids its contract not to take the land. As demonstrating 
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the urgent need, in April, 2000, to do this, plaintiff has never taken any step to utilize the 
property taken in any way, and remains engaged in negotiations to acquire other sites for 
the substation. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH OR FAULT ON THIS RECORD 
Appellee suggests that appellant's counsel has confessed fault in this case in order 
to relieve appellants of a finding of fault. In fact, counsel has simply pointed out that the 
event precipitating the default in this case was only counsel's inability, without fault, to 
appear on time. Otherwise, it is plain that appellants had properly sought and been granted 
additional time previously, and appellee does not dispute that, had appellant's counsel been 
able to be timely, appellee would not have objected, on April 11, 2000, to the further short 
extension necessary to complete the appraisal. The only prejudice to appellee asserted in 
this matter is that while a claim was pending that appellee had contracted away power to 
take the site in question, Wasatch County would not give appellee building permits to 
activate its order of immediate occupancy. 
Respecting the claim of prejudice, at least all of the following should be re-asserted: 
1. Appellants could not be at fault for maintaining a proper defense, or for the 
County's refusal of building permits, in light of such defense; 
2. The matter did not "frustrate the judicial process", because appellee could 
have tested that defense by motion at any time, and; 
3. There is no reason to believe that even if the District Court had scheduled 
trial the morning of April 11, 2000, a trial date could have been provided which did 
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not incorporate the brief extension appellants needed to complete the appraisal 
In short, there is neither evidence of fault or a frustration of the judicial process by 
appellants on the District Court's record. 
Peculiarly, appellee asserts (Brief at pg. 9) that a default would not have been in 
order had Mr. Bogerd, once free of the Dutch prosecution, "gotten a message to his counsel 
to move for a stay of proceedings." In fact, that is very nearly what occurred. 
The record fairly shows that work on the subject appraisal continued expeditiously 
into early 2000. Meanwhile, in late December 1999, Mr. Bogerd was summoned to appear 
in the Dutch criminal action. Whether appellee chooses now - without specific evidence -
to disbelieve it, the effect of such a summons, as reported to counsel, is to prevent leaving 
the immediate vicinity and to limit any communications regarding the prosecution to counsel 
appearing in the prosecution. It makes little difference, therefore, that Mr. Bogerd was not 
actually incarcerated for the whole period of December, 1999 to April 2000 when the 
prosecution ended, or that American counsel was able on some occasions to contact Mr. 
Bogerd's staff. Mr. Bogerd was not permitted to leave, or to explain his situation to 
American counsel or the court. Finally, freed of this restraint in early April, 2000, Mr. 
Bogerd called counsel and sought an extension. 
More importantly, upon being informed of the circumstances, counsel for appellee 
agreed not to oppose a request for such an extension at the pretrial conference April 11, 
2000. Had counsel for appellants not been unavoidably detained the morning of April 11, 
2000, it seems entirely likely that an appropriate extension would have been sought and 
granted. 
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In short, the determinant factor in changing the extension which could and should 
have happened the morning of April 11, 2000, into a default, was not that Mr. Bogerd did 
not call to seek an extension earlier than he did, but that counsel had an unfortunate drug 
reaction and was late on April 11. 
EFFECTIVE, LESSER SANCTIONS WERE READILY AVAILABLE 
Further, appellee suggests that it is not the duty of Utah District Courts to canvass 
lesser sanctions before resorting to default, despite statements like that in Tucker Realty, 
Inc. v. Nunlev. 396 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1964): 
We recognize that the granting of a judgment against a party solely for 
disobeying an order to cooperate in discovery procedure is a stringent 
measure which should be employed with caution and restraint and only where 
the failure has been willful and the interests of justice so demand. Except in 
very aggravated cases, less serious sanctions undoubtedly could be applied to 
accomplish the desired result, particularly where there is any likelihood of 
injustice by depriving a party of a meritorious cause of action or defense. 
Whether the failure to comply with the court's order is willful and whether 
the circumstances are so aggravated as to justify the action taken is primarily 
for the trial court to determine. Unless it is shown that his action is without 
support in the record, or is a plain abuse of discretion, it should not be 
disturbed. 
396 P.2d at 412 (citations omitted). 
Nothing here suggests that what is "primarily" the responsibility of the District Court 
is not subject to review. Certainly, there is nothing in this statement which suggests that a 
judgment of default will be left undisturbed which wholly fails to consider "whether the 
failure to comply with the court's order is willful and whether the circumstances are so 
aggravated as to justify the action taken." Where, in a case of default, it is obvious on the 
face of the record that lesser sanctions which fully disposed of any claim of prejudice were 
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readily available, and were ignored by the District Court, and the court declines 
consideration of evidence non-compliance was involuntary, it is plain without more that the 
"action is without support in the record." 
THE DEFAULT PLAINLY DENIES CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED DUE 
PROCESS 
Appellant suggests that Utah Department of Transportation v. Osguthorpe. 892 P.2d 
4 (Utah 1995) demonstrates the appropriateness of the default in this condemnation case. 
The opposite is true. 
Not only are the facts in Osguthorpe regarding non-compliance (with repeated 
discovery orders) vastly different, the District Court there made specific findings of 
willfulness (quoted 892 P.2d at 6), and the case states a flat constitutional requirement of 
opportunity to be heard on just compensation: "In an exercise of the power of eminent 
domain, due process requires that the owners be given an opportunity to be heard on the 
issue of compensation . . . The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity 
to be heard, at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, and when this opportunity 
is granted a complainant, who chooses not to exercise it, that complainant cannot later 
plead a denial of procedural due process." 892 P.2d at 6-7. There "The default [entered 
December, 1993] provided for an evidentiary hearing to determine the compensation to be 
paid. A notice of hearing was served on Osguthorpe . . . [which] advised him that a hearing 
would be held on January 10, 1994, at which time evidence would be received relative to 
the compensation to be paid . . . Osguthorpe failed to respond and did not appear at the 
hearing." Id- at 5. 
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The effect of the default in the present case is to deny any meaningful opportunity 
to be heard. While condemnors present an "appraisal of value" at the time of obtaining an 
order of immediate occupancy (see Section 78-34-9, U.C.A. (1953)), courts accept (and in 
this case accepted) minimal "affidavits" without supporting analysis or documentation, no 
hearing on value is held at that time, and no final decision is made. Both the right to 
condemn and the compensation due remain in issue pending further hearings. Id.; Utah 
State Rd. Common v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984); Utah Copper Co. v. Montana 
Bingham Consolidated Mining Co., 255 Pac. 672 (Utah 1926). The "affidavit" regarding a 
"preliminary analysis" presented by appellee at that time (see Exhibit "A" hereto, R. 39-45) 
excluded, without explanation, severance damage, the bulk of contested compensation in this 
case. The only meaningful opportunity to be heard on compensation in this case was the 
further statutory hearing (see Section 78-34-10, U.C.A. (1953)) which never occurred. 
The default in the present case, did not "provide for an evidentiary hearing to 
determine compensation to be paid", as in Osguthorpe. Further, of course, inability to 
complete an appraisal as scheduled, absent any consideration of whether the failure was 
voluntary, cannot be regarded as a choice to forego an opportunity to be heard.2 The 
record here shows denial of opportunity to be heard; the District Court declined to consider 
whether loss of the constitutionally required opportunity was voluntary. 
2
 Appellee suggests that Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984) supports the 
default entered in the present case. Larsen involved a motion to set aside a default 
under Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P., and specifically found that as the District Court correctly 
found defendants' non-compliance voluntary, defendant had failed to show "excusable 
mistake, inadvertence or neglect." Here the District Court declined to consider 
compelling evidence that any non-compliance was involuntary, and therefore, cannot 
show any knowing waiver of the constitutional right to a meaningful hearing. 
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All of the same considerations apply to denial of hearing on the issue of whether 
appellee contracted away the right to select the site condemned. While the defendant in 
Osguthorpe had waived the right to contest the power to take, appellants here have 
preserved it. The default denies hearing on that as well. 
Under Osguthorpe, absent evidence or a determination below that any non-
compliance by appellants was willful and amounted to knowing rejection of a right to be 
heard, the default in the present case is a blank denial of due process. 
THE RULING CONTAINS AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Appellee is correct, of course, that a default will be overturned where the record 
below does not support it, or where it incorporates an incorrect conclusion of law. See 
Hales, supra, 999 P.2d at 588; Wright v. Wright 941 P.2d 646, 649 (U. Apps. 1997). 
Appellee is simply wrong that the District Court's Ruling does not incorporate an erroneous 
conclusion of law. 
The first of the District Court's "Conclusions of Law" is an unsupported, and 
erroneous, finding of fact. The second is also a finding of fact. The third is inartfully 
stated, but necessarily concludes that mere non-compliance with a scheduling order, even 
if involuntary, coupled with an unsupported claim of prejudice to plaintiff, is a sufficient 
basis for a default, and notwithstanding defendant is thereby denied due process in the form 
of a meaningful hearing on compensation. The conclusion that appellee was entitled to a 
default in the circumstances related was entirely erroneous. Obviously, the "Ruling" is based 
upon an incorrect conclusion of law. It is also true that the record does not support the 
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ruling, but that effect is due to the failure of the District Court to establish and comply with 
a correct legal standard. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The District Court threatened a default in this matter if defendants were not 
represented by counsel as necessary following November 26, 1999. The morning of April 
11, 2000, it appears that the Clerk of the Court neglected to advise the District Judge that 
counsel would re-appear, but had been unavoidably delayed. As it thus appeared that the 
conditions for entry of a default were met, the Court entered one. The matter has since 
evolved into a refusal of the District Court to acknowledge that the impression obtained 
April 11, 2000, was erroneous, and that no other basis for imposing a default existed. 
The effort to construct a basis for default after the fact in this case cannot succeed. 
Defendants' behavior until April 11, 2000, was in compliance with the District Court's 
scheduling orders as properly extended. The non-compliance on the morning of April 11, 
2000, is not shown to have frustrated the judicial process in any degree, nor to have 
prejudiced plaintiff in any way not readily avoidably by plaintiff. Most of all, any non-
compliance was wholly involuntary: defendants were prevented by the imposition of criminal 
process elsewhere from fully complying with the Court's schedule. 
The District Court wholly failed to consider these matters. It is not adequate now 
to claim that had it done so, it is possible that a similar resolution could have been reached. 
It failed to do so, as a consequence of which the District Court's order not only incorporates 
an erroneous conclusion of law, but is wholly unsupported by the record. No conclusion can 
16 
be drawn that a default is appropriate in this case absent consideration of matters the 
District Court declines to acknowledge. The default herein should he vacated and this 
matter re-instated. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 12th day of March, 2002. 
E. Craig Sma^ 
Attorney for Appell; 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
"APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF" to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 13th day of March, 
2002 to the following: 
Tony Rampton 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook, & McDonough 
170 So. Main #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2034 
7 
/ 
/ 
E. Cra 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Anthony L. Rampton, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Post Office Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0561 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, an Oregon corporation, 
dba Utah Power, successor in interest 
by merger of Utah Power and Light 
Company, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, an entity 
formed under the laws of The Netherlands; 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS, an entity formed under the laws 
of The Netherlands; and JORDAN 
INVESTMENTS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
BRYCE A. CLINGER, being first duly sworn, hereby deposes and states: 
1. I am a Certified General Appraiser licensed by the state of Utah. I am a 
Member of Appraisal Institute No. 6576. My qualifications are attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
BRYCE A. CLINGER 
Civil No.: 980500241 
Judge: 
2. I have substantial experience in appraising properties in the vicinity of the 
Jordanelle Reservoir having, among other things, acted as appraiser for the Bureau of 
Reclamation with respect to its condemnation of properties for purposes of constructing 
the Jordanelle Dam and Reservoir. 
3. I have been asked by Utah Power to perform an appraisal of the easements 
(transmission line) and fee simple (Jordanelle Substation) being condemned by Utah 
Power in this action including those properties presently owned by Stichting Mayflower 
and related entities. 
4. In performing this appraisal, I have determined the market value of the 
subject properties utilizing the comparable sales approach to valuation, as well as an 
analysis of proposed development. For these purposes, "market value" is defined as the 
most probable price which a property should bring in a competitive and open market 
under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and the seller each acting prudently 
and knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus. 
5. Using this method of valuation, I have determined that the total value of 
the easements and fee simple being condemned on Stichting Mayflower properties as of 
the date of the filing of the Complaint is $196,070. See Exhibit B attached hereto. 
6. It is also my opinion that there will be no severance damage accruing to 
the portions of Stichting Mayflower property not sought to be condemned. 
? 
DATED this day of September. 1998. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATEOFUTAH 
CATOLDELBfli: 
391 SoulhOnnp*«<,a*CI 
*"7i ' i- _ j - ^ u *-?-£*'* 
pryce A. Clinger 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 7_ day of Septem 
1998. 
Notary Public 
sl/A^£ 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
42-
Qualifications for Bryce A. Clinger, MAI 
Certified General Appraiser- State of Utah 
CG 000 36986. Expiration- C 30-99 
Professional Affiliation: 
Member of Appraisal Institute. No 667G 
Collage Education: 
BS University Studies 
University Studies — Accounting/Finance 
Brigham Young Unrversity, 1974 
Experience: 
1QH1 - Now Appraiser and Consultant 
Self-employed 
1976 - 1981 Appraiser, associated with 
Zane D. Bergeson. MAI 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1978 - 1981 Appraiser and Development Manager 
Beneficial Development Co. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1974 - 1976 Appraiser, Utah Dcpai (merit of 
Transportation 
Salt Lake City. Utah 
1973 - 1974 Appraiser. Zions First National Bank 
Provo, Utah 
Advanced Appraisal Course Study: 
Society of Real Estate Appraisers 
"An Introduction to Appraising Real Property" 
Salt Lake City. Utah. 1974 
Society of Real Estate Appraisers 
"Principles of Income Property Appraising" 
University of Utah. 1975 
American Society of F«« m Managers & Rural Appraisers 
Eminent Domain School 
Salt Lake City. Utah. 1976 
American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers 
"Urban Properties" 
Bloomlngton. Indiana, 19/6 
American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers 
"Introduction to Investment Analysis" 
Boulder, Colorado, 1980 
Appraisal Institute 
"Standards of Professional Practice Parts A & B 
Botee, Idaho 1992 
Continuing Education Seminars — past 7 years only: 
Sep 1991 Course 403 Easement Valuation 
International Right of Way Assoc. 
Oct 1991 The Appraiser As An Expert Witness 
(AIREA) 
Feb 1992 Reviewing Appraisals (Al) 
Sep 1992 Subdivision Analysis (SREA) 
Oct 1993 Appraising From Bluepnnts and 
Specifications (Al) 
Apr 1994 Feasibility Analysis and Highest 
and Best Use (Al) 
Jul 1994 Maximizing the "Value" of an 
Appraisal Practice (Al) 
Jul 1994 Current Issues &. Misconceptions 
In the Appidisdl Pmcess (Al) 
Sep 1994 Understanding Limited Appraisals 
and Reporting Options (Al) 
May 1996 Geological Concerns in Real 
Estate (UT. Chapter. Al) 
May 1998 Commercial Heating, Ventilation, 
and Air Conditioning Systems 
(UT. Chapter, Al) 
Sep 1995 Appraisal Review - Income 
Properties (Al) 
Sep 1996 Advanced Techniques in 
Investment Feasibility (Al) 
Rep 1997 New Industrial Valuation (Al) 
Nov 1997 Data Confirmation & Venfication 
Methods (Al) 
Jul 1998 Valuation of Contaminated Properties 
Course 407 (IRWA) 
Bryce A. Clinger has completed the requirements 
under the continuing education program of the 
Appraisal Institute. 
Types of Real Estate Appraised 
Retail and Commercial Building3 
Office Buildings 
(ndustnal Properties 
Agriculture Properties 
Right of Way Valuation 
Special Purpose Properties 
Vacant land, various uses 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Bryce A. d i n g e r , MAI 
Real Estate Appraiser and Counselor 
1031 North 250 East 
Centerviile. UT 84014-1621 
Phone/fax: (801)295-4523 
March 11, 1998 
TO: Claudia Conder, Utah Power 
REF.: — Mayflower Ownerships, 138kVpowerline 
My preliminary analysis of this appraisal problem shows the following 
conclusions: 
THE NORTH PARCEL -- 1,050 acres total ownership 
Parcel No. 3 (Richardson Flat) 
0.97 acres @ $5,000 per a c x 60% of fee $ 2,910 
Parcel No. 5 (Hillside above the old RR R/W) 
3.24 acres @ $5,000 per ac x 60% of fee 9,720 
Parcel No. 8 (Span over Sage Hen Hollow) 
0.58 acres @ $5,000 per ac x 60% of fee 1,740 
Total for the North Parcel $ 14,370 
THE SOUTH PARCEL - Master planned 1,400 acres 
Parcel 11 (a) (Span over McHenry Canyon) 
0.53 acres @ $30,000 per ac x 60% of fee $ 9,540 
Parcel 11 (b) (Hail Mtn. east slope) 
5.12 acres @ $30,000 per ac x 60% 92,160 
Substation site near the pedestrian underpass 
2.0 acres @ $40,000 per acre 80,000 
Total for the South Parcel $181,700 
TOTAL FOR MAYFLOWER OWNERSHIPS $196,070 
3/11/98 MEMO Page 
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